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The Problem of Evasion
» Presence of adversary raises fundamental 
problems for Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
(NIDS)
» Network traffic passively analyzed from within a network is 
inherently ambiguous
» Examples:
» How will end-system reassemble inconsistent fragments?
» What about inconsistent TCP segments?
» What sequence #s in RSTs will tear down a connection?
» Inconsistent UDP length fields?
» > 70 others!  [HKP01]
The Problem of Evasion, con’t
» Evasions can occur at different semantic levels 
(network/transport/app.)
» Can’t alert on mere presence of ambiguity due to 
the problem of “crud”
» I.e., real-world traffic full of weird-but-benign ambiguities
» Analyzing network traffic at a high semantic level 
requires extensive state … which an adversary can 
target.
How Well Do Today’s NIDS
Resist Evasion?
» Answer: we don’t know
» Vendors rarely discuss the issue
» “Trust us, our system is hardened” 
» Does not provide a market advantage 
» Goal of our idsprobe framework:
» To provide sound, repeatable means to assess how 
well network intrusion detection systems perform in the 
face of evasions.
idsprobe Architecture
Trace-based idsprobe results
» We compared Bro 1.2.1 to Snort 2.6.1.4
» 196 test traces generated from 5 input traces 
containing basic HTTP GETs
» Correct signature matching in both NIDS
» But: substantial differences in evasion-related 
alerts
Trace-based idsprobe results, cont'd
» Snort over-reports non-issues and misses real evasions:
» Benign right-aligned partial retransmission flagged as TCP 
checksum change
» Nonsensical “evasive FIN” detections
     [**] [111:24:1] (spp_stream4) possible EVASIVE FIN detection [**]
     03/19­00:00:09.176188 10.48.0.1:2010 ­> 10.48.0.81:80
     TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:77
     ***AP*** Seq: 0x92A Ack: 0x33928A9F Win: 0x8000 TcpLen: 20
» Sole correct alert: overlapping IP fragments
» Snort 2.8.0.1 fixed some issues, but introduced new ones: 
inconsistent forward retransmission overlap no longer detected 
Trace-based idsprobe results, cont'd
» Observations from long-term operation
» 24h trace of ICSI uplink
» Striking absence of consensus
» Result:
Detection of evasive maneuvers remains far 
less developed than basic signature matching.
Trace-based idsprobe results, cont'd
Trace-based idsprobe results, cont'd
Trace-based idsprobe results, cont'd
Live Testing
» Capturing full range of evasion threats and defenses 
requires on-line testing as well as off-line
» Additional threats:
» Resource exhaustion (CPU, memory) …
» … leading to packet drops
» Defenses:
» Normalization [Handley, Paxson, Kreibich, USENIX SEC 2001]
» Active mapping [Shankar & Paxson, IEEE S&P 2003]
» Host-based disambiguation [Dreger et al., DIMVA 2005]
» Leverage off-line testing components
» Synthesize end systems when not required (e.g., for 
normalization)
Live Testing Architecture
Summary
» We built a framework for introducing evasive 
maneuvers into traffic traces
» Striking absence of consensus in output of 
commonly used open-source NIDSs
» Questions?
